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Taking reincarnation seriously: 




School of Philosophy, Religion and the History of Science, 
University of Leeds, United Kingdom 
 
Reincarnation has not been entirely neglected in the philosophy of religion but it has 
not always been taken seriously or carefully discussed in relation to its role in 
believers’ lives. John Hick is exceptional insofar as he gave sustained attention to the 
belief, at least as it features in the philosophies of Vedダnta and Buddhism. While 
acknowledging the value of Hick’s recognition of the variety of reincarnation beliefs, 
this paper critically engages with certain aspects of his approach. It argues that Hick’s 
search for a ‘criterion’ of reincarnation is misguided, and that his distinction between 
‘factual’ and ‘mythic’ forms of the doctrine is over-simplifying.  
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Western writers have usually not paid sufficiently close attention to eastern thought to do 
more than reject reincarnation as incompatible with accepted Jewish, Christian or Muslim 
teaching. However the Hindu and Buddhist conceptions deserve more serious attention.1 
 
If, as John Hick maintained, ‘the philosophy of religion is not properly just the philosophy of 
the Christian (or Judaeo-Christian) tradition, but in principle of religion throughout history 
and throughout the world’,2 then, given the pervasiveness of beliefs in reincarnation in 
numerous religious traditions, inquiry into these beliefs ought to have a prominent place in  
the philosophical study of religion. When we look for examples of such inquiry, although we 
do find a fair number, they tend to be undertaken without much careful consideration of the 
religious traditions within which beliefs in reincarnation have their primary place. A partial 
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exception to this tendency is exhibited in the work of Hick himself, most discernibly in his 
Death and Eternal Life but also more fleetingly in other publications.3 While remaining 
largely disdainful of what he termed ‘popular’ ideas of reincarnation,4 Hick had a high regard 
for the philosophical conceptions of this notion that are formulated in the traditions of 
Vedダnta and Buddhism. Hick not only considered these to be coherent, but also came to 
believe that something quite like the Buddhist formulation is probably true. In Death and 
Eternal Life, for instance, he declares cautiously that ‘There are forms of reincarnation 
doctrine which may be broadly true pictures of what actually happens’,5 and in later work he 
insists that ‘there must be a series of further lives’ beyond our present one, and that it is ‘most 
probably’ not the case that our present life is our first.6 This belief in multiple lives was 
connected with Hick’s soteriology. Roughly speaking, he maintained that everyone is 
heading for salvation in the end but that it takes numerous lifetimes for most of us to develop 
the moral and spiritual qualities that make us worthy of heaven.7  
Clearly, Hick was, among other things, a constructive theologian who devised his own 
vision of reality and of the purpose of human life. Doctrines of reincarnation constitute one 
area of traditional religious beliefs upon which he drew in order to construct a systematic 
worldview that has been a significant stimulus for other theologians and philosophers of 
religion. While a critical study of Hick’s overall system lies beyond my current purpose, the 
present paper contributes to an informed assessment of that system by closely examining his 
treatment of reincarnation. Through critical engagement with Hick’s ideas, this paper also 
aims to enhance the level of philosophical discussion of reincarnation itself within the 
philosophy of religion and to scrutinize certain assumptions that are often brought to 
philosophical inquiries into religious beliefs more generally. 
Two features of Hick’s treatment in particular will be discussed. Section I deals with 
Hick’s search for ‘the criterion or criteria’ for someone now alive being well described as the 
‘same person’ as someone now dead,8 and explains how Hick arrives at the conclusion that ‘a 
link of memory is essential’ to doctrines of reincarnation.9 Section II  explores the distinction 
                                                          
3 See especially: Hick, Philosophy of Religion, ch. 11; Death and Eternal Life, chs 16–19; Dialogues in the 
Philosophy of Religion, 11–12; An Interpretation of Religion, 367–69; The New Frontier of Religion and 
Science, 194–200; Between Faith and Doubt, 152–158. 
4 See, for example, Hick, Between Faith and Doubt, 152– 3. 
5 Hick, Death and Eternal Life, 391 (original emphasis). 
6 Hick, Between Faith and Doubt, 151, 157. 
7 See, for example, ibid., 151 
8 See Hick, Death and Eternal Life, 305; Philosophy of Religion, 133. 
9 See Hick, Death and Eternal Life, 364. 
3 
 
that Hick makes between, on the one hand, a ‘factual’ conception of reincarnation and, on the 
other hand, what he variously calls ‘a metaphysical picture without factual content’, ‘a purely 
metaphysical theory’, or ‘an illuminating myth’.10 As we shall see, these two features are 
closely interconnected, as the ‘link of memory’ criterion, which Hick takes to be crucial, is 
also what on his view distinguishes factual from non-factual conceptions of reincarnation. In 
the course of my discussion issues will be raised concerning certain assumptions that seem to 
be operative in Hick’s argument, notably the assumption that a doctrine’s being factual 
consists in its making an ‘actual or possible experiential difference’ along with certain 
auxiliary assumptions concerning what counts as making such a difference. These 
assumptions lead Hick to deny that what he terms ‘mythic’ conceptions of reincarnation 
‘could be of any practical interest to anyone’, on the grounds that they lack a belief in the 
‘link of memory’ that Hick takes to be so essential. Section III  argues that this assertion is 
unwarranted, firstly because there are ‘mythic’ conceptions of reincarnation that can 
accommodate a version of the memory link, and secondly because there are reasons to doubt 
whether any memory link is essential to reincarnation beliefs in the first place.  
 
I. The search for a criterion 
The search for ‘the criterion or criteria by which someone living today is said to be the same 
person as someone who lived [much earlier], of whom he has no knowledge or memory’ is a 
central preoccupation of Hick’s most sustained discussion of reincarnation.11 Aware that 
there are people who have claimed to remember former lives, Hick admits that if such claims 
are genuine, these memories would constitute one criterion of personal identity across 
lifetimes.12 He is also aware, though, that the vast majority of people have no recollection 
whatsoever of former lives, and the issue that concerns him is whether reincarnation could be 
a universal phenomenon – as it is claimed to be by adherents of religio-philosophical 
traditions such as Vedダnta and Buddhism – rather than something that happens only to a 
small number of individuals. So it appears that another criterion is required. Bodily continuity 
is clearly a non-starter, as no one maintains that someone who reincarnates retains the same, 
materially continuous, body from one life to the next;13 so Hick holds that the continuous 
                                                          
10 Ibid., 327, 356, 327. 
11 Ibid., 305. 
12 For Hick’s discussion of empirical investigations into purported memories of former lives, see ibid., 373–378, 
and Between Faith and Doubt, 153–155. 
13 It has been claimed that bodily characteristics such as birthmarks and wounds can be ‘“reincarnationally” 
inherited’ from a previous life (Christie-Murray, Reincarnation, 230), but this is not claimed to be because the 
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factor must be something ‘mental’. He asserts that, in speaking of a person’s being born, 
living for a certain time, then dying and being born again, ‘we are presupposing the existence 
of a continuous mental entity which we may call the self or the person.’14 
In the absence of continuity of memory, at least as a universal phenomenon, Hick 
considers whether the connecting link that he is seeking might consist in ‘the psychological 
continuity of a pattern of mental dispositions.’15 In later work, he refers to this as a 
‘dispositional (or karmic) structure’ which underlies, and ‘which both affects and is affected 
by’, ‘the now consciously thinking and acting personality’.16 What Hick has in mind here are, 
principally, character traits; he is wondering whether, if someone who is now alive exhibits at 
least some of the character traits of a person who previously existed, this could be construed 
as criterial for the later person’s being a reincarnation of the earlier. Hick discounts this 
proposal, however, on the grounds that it is too permissive to be a viable criterion for two 
individuals to be counted as the same person. He notes that certain people who are alive at the 
same time have character traits in common, and to regard simultaneously existing people as 
numerically identical ‘would be a direct violation of our concept of “same person”.’17 And 
even in cases where one of the two individuals with common character traits is no longer 
alive, there are nevertheless liable to be many other people with those same, or very similar, 
traits; and hence the plausibility of regarding the two individuals in question as links in a 
chain of reincarnations is undermined.18 It is undermined because there is no principled 
reason for considering them alone to be linked by reincarnation when there are so many other 
equally viable candidates. Thus it would seem that all three of the criteria of personal identity 
countenanced by Hick – namely bodily continuity, a link of memory, and continuity of 
dispositional structure – have been ruled out, and therefore it may appear that belief in 
reincarnation becomes incoherent or at least lacks credible support. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
material constituents of the body remain the same. Hence it would be misleading to speak of bodily continuity 
even in these cases. For extensive work on the putative links between reincarnation and birthmarks and birth 
defects, see Stevenson, Reincarnation and Biology. 
14 Hick, Death and Eternal Life, 304. 
15 Ibid., 307; Philosophy of Religion, 134. 
16 Hick, Dialogues in the Philosophy of Religion, 11. See also idem, Between Faith and Doubt, 155–156, and 
The New Frontier of Religion and Science, 199. 
17 Hick, Death and Eternal Life, 304. There are in fact cases of peoples who purportedly believe in ‘multiple 
simultaneous reincarnation’ś see, for example, Mills, “Reincarnation Belief among North American Indians and 
Inuit,” 28–29. I briefly discuss such cases in Burley, “Believing in Reincarnation,” 272–277, but shall not be 
considering them here. 
18 See Hick, Death and Eternal Life, 307–308. 
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In work subsequent to Death and Eternal Life, Hick downplays talk of ‘personal identity’ 
across different lives, not least because he is aware that this terminology is problematic in the 
context of Buddhism. Buddhists – or, at any rate, those schools of Buddhism with which Hick 
has the closest affinity – typically deny the existence of a permanent self, and hence it is 
unlikely that they would readily accept a description of the relation between two members of 
a succession of rebirths as one of personal identity.19 Rather, as Hick acknowledges, they are 
more likely to speak of an ongoing ‘karmic process’, in which consequences follow actions, 
some of which consequences will manifest in future lives.20 Intermingled in Buddhism with 
this notion of a succession of consequences caused or conditioned by prior actions is the 
notion of what Hick calls ‘an ever-changing series of moments of consciousness.’21 As Hick 
observes, a common view among Buddhists is that ‘the first moment of thought in the new 
stream of life stands in direct causal sequence to the last moment of thought in the dying 
person, which thought thus determines the nature of the next birth.’22 ‘Thought’ here can be 
construed broadly, and need not imply conscious thought – or what contemporary analytic 
philosophers of mind might call ‘phenomenal consciousness’.23 Hence, although some 
Buddhists do speak of the ‘continuation of mind’ or of a ‘stream of consciousness’ persisting 
across reincarnations,24 the more prevalent view is that, for at least the vast majority of 
reincarnating individuals, the continuity lies below the level of conscious awareness. 
Despite his recognition, and indeed approval, of these points from Buddhism (which 
amount to the idea that ‘reincarnation’ or ‘rebirth’ can be a coherent concept even if it 
involves oppugning the claim that, if B is a reincarnation of A, then B must be the same 
person as A) Hick persisted in talking of the need for something to be passed on from one life 
to the next. He became especially fond of the analogy of relay runners passing a torch from 
one person to anotherŚ ‘We are like the runners in a relay raceŚ the torch has been handed to 
                                                          
19 It bears emphasizing, though, that there have been numerous disagreements between competing Buddhist 
schools on this and related matters. For illuminating discussion, see McDermott, “Karma and Rebirth in Early 
Buddhism,” esp. 167–172. For further discussion of Buddhist accounts of personhood, see Collins, Selfless 
Persons. 
20 Hick uses the term ‘karmic process’ in, among other places, Between Faith and Doubt, 155, and Problems of 
Religious Pluralism, 26. 
21 Hick, The New Frontier of Religion and Science, 196. 
22 Hick, Death and Eternal Life, 345. 
23 Ned Block devised a distinction between ‘phenomenal consciousness’ and ‘access-consciousness’ in his 
article “On a Confusion about the Function of Consciousness.” I am doubtful that the distinction is a clear one, 
but, roughly speaking, to be phenomenally conscious of something is to have immediate perceptual awareness of 
it, whereas to have access-consciousness of that thing is for knowledge of it to be able to enter into one’s 
judgements and actions but without one’s necessarily being immediately aware that this is occurring. 
24 See, for example, the Fourteenth Dalai Lama, interviewed in Bärlocher, Testimonies of Tibetan Tulkus, 117. 
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us and for a short time the whole project depends upon us. Our life thus has urgent 
meaning.’25 But this image, of course, encourages the thought that there is some ‘thing’ that 
remains the same from one life to the next, which is the very thought that many Buddhists 
have deliberately tried to discard. As one western Buddhist writer has put it, part of the 
problem is the tendency of people in general ‘to to think in terms of “things” rather than 
conditions’Ś 
 
we think that for rebirth to mean anything, there must be a thing (e.g. a soul) that passes 
from life to life, but perhaps this static model is inadequate. […] a relationship can exist 
between two ‘things’ such that the second arises in dependence upon the first, and yet no 
‘thing’ passes between them.26 
 
It is unfortunate that Hick, despite being aware of this point, repeats the relay race analogy so 
frequently and uncritically. 
In the light of the apparent failure to find something that can both plausibly be held to be 
passed on from one life to the next and usefully serve to distinguish a relation of 
reincarnation from one of mere similarity of character traits, Hick raises the question whether 
the doctrine of reincarnation is appositely thought of as ‘a factual assertion’ at all.27 I shall 
come to his considerations on that matter in section II  below. Here, however, it is important 
to register Hick’s conviction that at least some versions of the doctrine do make ‘sufficient 
connection with actual or possible human experience’ for the doctrine ‘to constitute […] a 
factual claim.’28 The connection with experience that Hick envisages is the link of memory. 
For although he had earlier admitted that relatively few, if any, individuals exhibit credible 
recollections of previous lives, there exists nevertheless, within both Hindu and Buddhist 
traditions, the hope of a liberatory state of spiritual awakening, a state termed moksha or 
nirvダna, in which, or shortly prior to which, one may attain lucid past-life recall – ‘a total 
retrospective awareness’29 – which offers effective confirmation of reincarnation. As a classic 
                                                          
25 Hick, An Autobiography, 226. See also his The Fifth Dimension, 248; The New Frontier of Religion and 
Science, 200; and Between Faith and Doubt, 158. 
26 Nagapriya, Exploring Karma and Rebirth, 87– 8. Occasionally, Buddhists do use phrases that suggest a soul 
being released from one body and entering another (see, for example, Tsering Wangyal’s article “The 
Reincarnation of Kathleen Frei,” quoted in Bärlocher, Testimonies of Tibetan Tulkus, 755), but such 
phraseology is relatively rare among Buddhists. 
27 Hick, Death and Eternal Life, 327. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid., 388. 
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instance of such retrospective awareness, Hick cites the experience attributed to Gautama the 
Buddha, who is held within Buddhist traditions to have recalled details of countless of his 
own former lives as well as achieving insight into the multiple lives of others.30 
With this hoped-for remembrance of the chain of karmicly connected lives in sight, Hick 
declares ‘a memory link’ to be ‘essential to any theory which identifies individuals as being 
reincarnations of specific members of an earlier generation and which thus speaks of a 
particular series as the successive lives of one and the same soul.’31 ‘[O]ne and the same soul’ 
is probably not a phrase that Hick would have used in his later writings, due to his more 
consistent mindfulness of the denial of a permanent soul in many forms of Buddhism. He did, 
however, continue to insist that ‘there must be an underlying thread of memory, which may 
possibly sometimes emerge in consciousness’,32 and which will be ‘actualised at the end of a 
long journey through many lives’ś33 it is that thread which ‘constitutes the connection of this 
particular series of mortal lives.’34 Provided this memory link – at least in potentiality – is 
admitted, Hick finds the reincarnation doctrine to be coherently conceived as more than a 
mere ‘metaphysical theory’ś ‘metaphysical’ being used here ‘in the pejorative sense’ of a 
theory whose ‘truth or falsity makes no actual or possible experiential difference.’35 The 
theory does make an experiential difference, Hick maintains, because even if one does not 
currently recall any previous lives, one can legitimately expect to recall them eventually. 
It is worth noting that Hick’s search for a criterion of one individual’s being the 
reincarnation of another – even if the idea that the two individuals are the ‘same person’ is set 
aside – itself relies on a metaphysical picture, the picture of there being some connecting link 
which constitutes the logical foundation for the reincarnation doctrine itself. Largely 
overlooked in this search for a criterion is any close analysis of the place that believing in 
reincarnation has in believers’ lives, and how in particular it connects with certain ethical 
attitudes and modes of evaluation and action. It is noticeable that Hick disparages ‘the 
popular picture of reincarnation’,36 which includes the ‘idea of being born again as a lower 
                                                          
30 Hick (ibid., 379) quotes a discourse attributed to the Buddha from the Samyutta Nikダya, 2.213–214, and also 
mentions a passage from the Sダmaññaphala Sutta (Hick, ibid., 396, n. 34). See also Hick, Dialogues in the 
Philosophy of Religion, 11, and Between Faith and Doubt, 156. For more recent translations of the primary 
material, see Bodhi, The Connected Discourses of the Buddha, 673–674, and Gethin, Sayings of the Buddha, 33. 
31 Hick, Death and Eternal Life, 364. 
32 Hick, Between Faith and Doubt, 157. 
33 Hick, The New Frontier of Religion and Science, 196. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Hick, Death and Eternal Life, 356. 
36 Hick, Between Faith and Doubt, 152. 
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form of animal’ – an idea which, according to Hick, ‘has very little serious support’37 – and 
instead prefers to focus on more technical formulations of the doctrine in the philosophical 
literature of Vedダnta and, especially, relatively early Buddhism. There is, of course, nothing 
wrong with being selective in the sources that one discusses: it is impossible to discuss 
everything. And it is understandable that a philosopher such as Hick should be attracted to 
recognizably philosophical elaborations of the reincarnation doctrine. The notions of 
‘criteria’ and ‘support’ that pervade Hick’s treatment of the topic remain puzzling, however. 
Why, for example, should he say that the idea of being reborn as an animal ‘has very little 
support’? What kind of support should we be looking for? There are, after all, numerous 
stories in Buddhist and Hindu literature of people being reborn as animals. Indeed, a whole 
genre developed in early Buddhism of stories that purport to be of previous lives recalled by 
the Buddha himself, many of which were lives of animals or other non-human beings.38 Since 
these are mostly kinds of morality tale, which draw upon Indian folk traditions, they are 
probably part of what Hick meant by ‘the popular picture of reincarnation’. But, given that 
they are part of the rich and colourful mix of factors that contribute to the variegated doctrine 
of reincarnation, it is unclear why they should be considered unworthy of serious attention. 
What Hick seems to be assuming is that there is an essential core of the doctrine, residing 
beneath extraneous accretions such as folktales and everyday modes of discourse. On this 
assumption, if we can hone down the doctrine to its core (which task consists in largely 
excluding from one’s analysis the particular contexts within which expressions of belief in 
reincarnation have their natural place, and instead striving to discover the ‘criterion or 
criteria’ which ‘support’ that belief) then the ‘truth-value’ of the doctrine can be determined. 
The assumption is natural enough, and is one that recurs in other areas of the philosophy of 
religion.39 It is, in large part, this assumption that generates in Hick’s account a broad-
brushed distinction between a ‘factual’ and a ‘purely metaphysical’ way of understanding the 
doctrine of reincarnation,40 a distinction that risks glossing over fine nuances within and 
between particular versions of this doctrine. It is to a critical examination of that distinction 
that I now turn. 
 
                                                          
37 Ibid., 153. 
38 See Shaw, The Jダtakas. For further discussion, see Appleton, Jダtaka Stories in Theravダda Buddhism. 
39 I am thinking here of, for example, the way in which many philosophers of religion try to determine the truth-
value of a belief in God (or the proposition that God exists), or of a belief in eternal life, while dealing only with 
very thinly described conceptions of how these beliefs feature in believers’ lives. 
40 Hick, Death and Eternal Life, 327, 356. 
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II. ‘Factual’ and ‘purely metaphysical’ conceptions of reincarnation 
The task of understanding the ‘factual’–‘purely metaphysical’ distinction that Hick draws is 
complicated by the way in which he sketches the two sides of the alleged dichotomy. Having 
initially characterized ‘a factual assertion’ as one ‘which either corresponds or fails to 
correspond with reality,’ Hick fairly rapidly shifts the emphasis from correspondence with 
reality to connecting with human experience by suggesting that something’s constituting ‘a 
factual claim’ consists in its making ‘sufficient connection with actual or possible human 
experience’.41 From what Hick goes on to say, it is clear that the sort of connection with 
human experience that he regards as being especially pertinent to the question of whether the 
doctrine of reincarnation makes a factual assertion is that which I noted in section I, namely 
the connection of memory – this being the connection that obtains between a person at a 
given time and that same person at an earlier time by virtue of the person at the later time 
being able to remember being the person at the earlier time. As Hick sees it, even if the 
person at the earlier time died before the person at the later time was born, we nevertheless 
have something (a memory of the past) that corresponds with past reality – provided it is a 
reasonably accurate memory – and also connects with human experience. (Although Hick is 
not as explicit as he might have been, we may assume his point to be that there is a 
connection with human experience in the sense that the later person undergoes the experience 
of remembering a previous life.) 
Hick contrasts this ‘factual’ construal of the doctrine with one in which the doctrine is 
‘the painting of a metaphysical picture without factual content, such that its truth or falsity 
makes no difference to the course of actual or possible human experience’.42 He then further 
describes this latter interpretive possibility as one according to which the doctrine is taken to 
be ‘an illuminating myth – comparable for example with the [C]hristian myth of the fall of 
man from a state of original perfection’.43 Among the various points that could be made in 
relation to these brief characterizations are the following three. 
Firstly, since Hick does not regard metaphysical pictures as being invariably or 
necessarily devoid of factual content, we must assume that he is here singling out a specific 
kind of metaphysical picture. In a subsequent remark, which I quoted earlier, he indicates that 
he considers the term ‘metaphysical’ to have (at least) two sensesś for, having used the phrase 
‘purely metaphysical theory’, he then adds that he is, in this instance, using ‘metaphysical’ 
                                                          





‘in the pejorative sense that its truth or falsity makes no actual or possible experiential 
difference.’44 This implies that there is, for Hick, also a non-pejorative sense of 
‘metaphysical’, which would denote a theory whose truth or falsity would make an actual or 
possible experiential difference. In the absence of a variety of examples, it is not obvious 
what we should understand making (or not making) an experiential difference to amount to. 
But, as noted above, Hick does give, as one example of something that constitutes an 
experiential difference, the link of memory. Therefore w  can take it that, on Hick’s view, a 
theory (or doctrine or conception) of reincarnation is factual if it includes the claim that 
remembering previous lives is at least possible; and such a theory (or doctrine or conception) 
is non-factual – i.e., empty of factual content – if it does not include that claim, and includes 
no other claim concerning actual or possible changes to experience. The vagueness of this 
notion of making an experiential difference remains a problem for the distinction that Hick 
wants to make, and I shall return to this problem in due course. 
Secondly, given that it is a doctrine without factual content that he is contrasting with the 
factual construal of the doctrine, we might find it surprising that Hick refers to ‘its truth or 
falsity’. In other words, we might wonder how, by Hick’s own lights, a doctrine without 
factual content could have any truth-value at all. As we shall see, however, Hick does allow 
for different kinds of truth; for example, a doctrine could embody a moral truth or a 
mythological truth, or perhaps a spiritual truth, without its thereby embodying a factual truth. 
Hence, it seems that Hick is operating with a restricted sense of ‘factual’, according to which 
a claim or assertion is ‘factual’ if, and only if, it is in principle verifiable by some sort of 
‘experiential’ meansś and he is operating with a restricted sense of ‘experiential’, according to 
which remembering something (or possibly remembering it!) counts as a mode of experiential 
verification but many other things that do in fact involve a change in one’s experience would 
not count. (Instances of these ‘many other things’ will become apparent in my discussion of 
the following point.) 
Thirdly, when Hick writes of ‘an illuminating myth’, citing the illustrative example of the 
myth of the Fall, we may reasonably understand him to mean that what is, or could be, 
illuminated by the doctrine of reincarnation is, primarily, something about our ethical lives. 
In other words, the doctrine expresses something important about the human condition and 
the right way to live – indeed, we might even say that it expresses something true about these 
things – without our needing to describe it as true in a factual sense. This interpretation of 
                                                          
44 Ibid., 356. 
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Hick’s notion of an illuminating myth is supported by certain things that he says towards the 
end of his chapter on Buddhist conceptions of rebirth in Death and Eternal Life, and by 
briefer passages in some of his later works. In one later work, for example, he makes the 
following observation: 
 
The doctrine of reincarnation is seen by some as a mythological way of making vivid the 
moral truth that our actions have inevitable future consequences for good and ill, this 
being brought home to the imagination by the thought that the agent will personally reap 
those consequences in a future earthly life.45 
 
The suggestion here is that one way of understanding the doctrine of reincarnation is as an 
injunction to see our relationships with others, including those that we shall never meet 
because they will live after we have died, in such a way that the consequences of our actions 
for those others are treated as no less important than the consequences of our actions for 
ourselves. An exemplar of something approximating this interpretation is J. G. Jennings, who 
is one among a small cluster of interpreters cited by Hick in this connection.46 Jennings writes 
of the Buddha that, although he inherited the doctrine of karma from the Brahmanical cultural 
milieu in which he lived, he transformed it from a doctrine of individual compensation and 
retribution into one of responsibility for the well-being of humanity and of the world taken as 
a collective whole. With the Buddhist denial of permanent individual souls, Jennings argues, 
comes the view that the consequences of our actions are experienced not by ourselves in 
future lives, but by the whole world community over time, and yet the discourse of future 
lives is retained as a narrative vehicle for that essentially ethical message.47  
Among more recent advocates of the sort of ethical interpretation of karma and rebirth 
that Jennings outlines is Nagapriya, the British-born Buddhist whom I quoted earlier in 
connection with the problem of thinking of rebirth ‘in terms of “things” rather than 
conditions.’ Nagapriya wavers a little between, on the one hand, denying that believing in 
rebirth is necessary at all – or, at any rate, denying that it is ‘necessary in order to practise 
                                                          
45 Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, 349. Cf. ibid., 363Ś ‘There are some Hindus and Buddhists who regard 
the idea of rebirth as an illuminating myth’. 
46 In an endnote in An Interpretation of Religion (376, n. 9) the following sources are cited: Buddhadダsa, 
Toward the Truth; Nishitani, Religion and Nothingness, 173; Jennings, The Vedダntic Buddhism of the Buddha, 
xxiv–xxv; Deutsch, Advaita Vedダnta, ch. 5. 
47 See Jennings’ “General Introduction” in his The Vedダntic Buddhism of the Buddha, esp. xxiv–xxv, a passage 
from which is quoted in Hick, Death and Eternal Life, 358. See also Hick, Philosophy of Religion, 140–141. 
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Buddhism effectively’48 – and, on the other hand, claiming that ‘the traditional Buddhist 
doctrines of Karma and rebirth’, despite presenting ‘themselves in a somewhat archaic, even 
naive, guise’, ‘nevertheless communicate timeless truths about what it means to be a 
human.’49 The apparent wavering can be accounted for, however, if we note that Nagapriya’s 
view is that the ‘somewhat archaic’ form in which the ‘timeless truths’ are conveyed is to be 
understood metaphorically rather than literally.50 Thus we can read him as saying that 
although it is unecessary for Buddhists to believe in rebirth in a ‘literal’ sense, the metaphor 
of rebirth nevertheless carries an important ethical message that stands at the very centre of 
Buddhist teachings. The central truth, as Nagapriya puts it in the closing paragraph of his 
book, is that 
 
We bear responsibility to our future self [within our present life] and to other human 
beings through what we do. We have the power to transform the world for good or ill. It 
is through the compassionate exercise of this power that we fulfil our responsibility to life 
and transcend the confines of our ordinary mind. We place a feather on the scales of life 
that tips them towards goodness.51 
 
Although, when expounded in these terms, the ethical message in question sounds rather 
insipid, this in itself might tell us something about the use of the vocabulary of karma and 
rebirth within Buddhist traditions. What it tells us is that, even if we concur with Nagapriya 
that talk of karma and rebirth is to be understood metaphorically, it may nevertheless remain 
the case that these forms of language are indispensable and cannot simply be replaced by a 
‘literal’ paraphrase without considerable loss of ethical force.52 What Max Black has said 
concerning attempts to paraphrase metaphors more generally is certainly applicable here, 
namely that ‘the relevant weakness of the literal paraphrase is not that it may be tiresomely 
prolix or boringly explicit (or deficient in qualities of style); it fails to be a translation because 
it fails to give the insight that the metaphor did.’53 
                                                          
48 Nagapriya, Exploring Karma and Rebirth, 132. 
49 Ibid., 142. 
50 Ibid., 127. 
51 Ibid. 
52 It might also suggest that ‘literal’ versus ‘metaphorical’ is not quite the right way of characterizing the 
important differences in this area. But I shall not elaborate that thought here. 
53 Black, Models and Metaphors, 46. 
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A further instance of how the doctrine of rebirth might be read as an illuminating myth is 
a conception attributed by Hick to Bhikkhu Buddhadダsa, a twentieth-century Buddhist monk-
philosopher who, according to one commentator, is ‘widely acclaimed in Thailand as that 
country’s most provocative intellectual in the Buddhist Sangha.’54 Distinguishing between 
everyday uses of language and uses specific to the language of the Buddhist teachings 
(dhamma), Buddhadダsa interprets ‘birth’ within the latter context to denote the arising of the 
sense of ‘I’ or ‘me’ – i.e., the sense of being a distinct individual – rather than ‘physical birth 
from the mother’s womb.’55 Among the implications of this view is that notions of rebirth as 
something other than a human being are given a psychological emphasisŚ ‘As soon as anyone 
thinks like an animal, he is born as an animal […]. To think like a celestial being is to be born 
a celestial being.’56 This feature of the view is comparable to certain interpretations of 
reincarnation among recent Vedダntic philosophers, who, while demurring from Buddhadダsa 
on the figurative significance of ‘rebirth’ in other respects, would nevertheless concur that 
talk of rebirth in animal form is best viewed as ‘a figure of speech for rebirth with animal 
qualities.’57 
While it seems clear, then, that Hick has made a convincing case for there being a range 
of ways in which talk of reincarnation can be understood, there remains an important 
question over whether his binary distinction between ‘factual’ and ‘purely metaphysical’ (or 
‘mythological’) modes of understanding is a helpful means of representing that range. Here I 
need to return to the problematic way in which Hick deploys the notion of ‘experiential 
difference’ in setting out his distinction. As mentioned above, he characterizes ‘a 
metaphysical picture without factual content’ as one whose ‘truth or falsity makes no 
difference to the course of actual or possible human experience’, and contrasts this with ‘a 
factual claim’, which does indeed make a difference to (or a ‘sufficient connection with’) 
‘actual or possible human experience’.58 Given the vagueness of these phrases, however, we 
might wonder why the sorts of interpretations of reincarnation put forward by Jennings, 
Nagapriya and Buddhadダsa could not legitimately be described as factualś for they do, surely, 
present ways of understanding reincarnation that connect with, and make a difference to, 
actual or possible experience. In the case of the interpretations put forward by Jennings and 
                                                          
54 Swearer, “IntroductionŚ Buddhadダsa – ‘Servant of the Buddha’,” 10. 
55 Buddhadダsa, Toward the Truth, 68, quoted in Hick, Death and Eternal Life, 360. 
56 Buddhadダsa, ibid., quoted in Hick, Death and Eternal Life, 359–360. 
57 Radhakrishnan, An Idealist View of Life, 300. See also Prajnananda, “Preface,” 9, and Minor, “In Defense of 
Karma and Rebirth,” 34. 
58 Hick, Death and Eternal Life, 327; cf. 356. 
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Nagapriya, they make such a difference by highlighting our moral interconnectedness and 
responsibility for future generations, thereby contributing to an overall orientation of the 
Buddhist practitioner’s values away from self-centredness and towards universal compassion. 
The sort of interpretation advanced by Buddhadダs , meanwhile, has the potential to change 
one’s experience by emphasizing the opportunity that every moment presents for 
relinquishing attachment to a fixed conception of self-identity and instead giving full 
acknowledgement to the impermanence of all things, including oneself, that is so strongly 
advocated throughout Buddhist traditions. 
Even if we think of ‘making an experiential difference’ – as Hick seems to do – as being 
equivalent to lending itself to possible experiential verification, it is unclear why this 
condition could not be fulfilled by the sorts of interpretations just outlined. Hick focuses his 
attention on the possibility of remembering one’s previous lives – of enjoying a ‘total 
retrospective awareness’ akin to one of the stages in the Buddha’s purported enlightenment 
experience – and maintains that it is this hoped-for possibility that makes all the difference 
between a conception of reincarnation that someone could have good reason to d pt, and 
conceptions that could be of no ‘practical interest to anyone.’59 Furthermore, writes Hick, ‘It 
is only when we add memory – even if this should only become conscious at the end of the 
series of lives – that we have either the [B]uddhist, the [H]indu, or the popular conception of 
reincarnation or rebirth.’60 
There are two main problems with this emphasis on the importance of memory. Firstly, 
by utilizing an overly constrained notion of what remembering one’s previous lives consists 
in, Hick overlooks the possibility that ‘mythic’ conceptions of reincarnation may be able to 
accommodate the idea of such a remembrance; indeed, they may do so in ways that bring out 
ethical and spiritual significances to which Hick’s discussion pays little attention. Secondly, 
by stressing that it is only when the prospect of remembering one’s previous lives is present 
that a conception of reincarnation could have any practical interest, Hick prematurely 
forecloses religious possibilities; that is, he forecloses the possibility of forms of 
reincarnation belief that have a coherent place in people’s lives without requiring any 
expectation of past-life recall. In this instance, too, Hick underplays the ways in which 
reincarnation beliefs are typically woven into a broader network of values and practices with 
strong ethical meaning. These two concerns will be elaborated in the next section.  
 
                                                          




III. Reincarnation and the ‘link of memory’ 
When Hick asserts that ‘a link of memory’ is essential for any doctrine of reincarnation to be 
of practical interest to anyone, he echoes a common thought, versions of which have been 
voiced by Leibniz and Locke, among others. Locke, whom Hick quotes at some length, 
considers a case in which someone maintains that he has in him ‘the same Soul, that was in 
Nestor or Thersites, at the Siege of Troy,’ and yet has no conscious recollection of having 
performed the actions of either of them. In the absence of such memories, Locke maintains, 
the possession of the same soul ‘would no more make him the same Person with Nestor, than 
if some of the Particles of Matter, that were once a part of Nestor, were now a part of this 
Man’.61 Leibniz, putting the emphasis more squarely on what one would have reason to 
desire, offers the following invitation: 
 
Suppose that some person all of a sudden becomes the king of China, but only on the 
condition that he forgets what he has been, as if he were born anew; practically, or as far 
as the effects could be perceived, wouldn’t that be the same as if he were annihilated and 
a king of China created at the same instant in his place? That is something this individual 
would have no reason to desire.62 
 
Hick maintains, as we have seen, that the sorts of problems raised by Locke and Leibniz 
can be overcome by incorporating into the doctrine of reincarnation the notion of latent 
memories of previous lives – memories which, if not actualized before, may eventually be 
actualized as one approaches a state of spiritual enlightenment. However, given that Hick 
allows at least the coherence of what he calls ‘mythic’ conceptions of reincarnation, and 
provides an apparently sympathetic exposition of such conceptions as those offered by J. G. 
Jennings and Bhikkhu Buddhadダsa, it is far from clear why he precludes the possibility that 
conceptions of these kinds could have space for talk of recalling previous lives. 
If we think, for example, of the sort of ethical emphasis given to the doctrine of 
reincarnation in the interpretations of Jennings and Nagapriya, we could imagine the prospect 
of ‘remembering one’s previous lives’ as involving the thought of its becoming possible to 
remember all the deeds, words, and intentions in one’s life which have had positive or 
negative consequences either for oneself or for others, and of gaining insight into the further 
                                                          
61 Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Bk 2, ch. 27, §14; quoted in Hick, Death and Eternal 
Life, 305–306. 
62 Leibniz, “Discourse on Metaphysics,” §34. 
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repercussions that they may have for others in the future. Just as, on Jennings’ interpretation 
in particular, it is ‘desire […] that is […] said to tend to re-exist or be again’,63 so, in the 
revelation of one’s previous ‘lives’, it could be the succession of desires, perhaps both in 
oneself and in others, that are brought to full awareness. 
Furthermore, the idea of being reborn into different ‘realms’ of existence, which is 
prevalent both within Buddhist and within Hindu traditions, could be accommodated by 
invoking the sort of ‘psychological reading’ of the various realms that Nagapriya outlines.64 
This amounts to an elaboration of the mode of interpretation that we saw exemplified in 
Buddhadダsa’s construal of animal rebirth as consisting in thinking like an animal (‘simply 
act[ing] out our biological and instinctive urges’, as Nagapriya puts it65) and of celestial 
rebirth as consisting in thinking like a celestial being. On Nagapriya’s account, talk of rebirth 
into the preta realm (the realm of ghosts or shades) alludes to states of ‘extreme neurotic 
desire’ś the ‘realm of the angry gods is one of extreme jealousy, competitiveness, anger, and 
frustration’ś and the various hell worlds are states of debilitating suffering, pain, isolation, 
and mental illness.66 Remembering these ‘rebirths’ would involve recollecting the various 
psychological states that one has undergone over the course of one’s life and again seeing the 
connections between these, the conditions that gave rise to them and the consequences that 
ensued. None of this seems to constitute an especially far-fetched or overly reductive 
interpretation of the traditional Buddhist doctrines, and in view of what Hick says about the 
idea of animal rebirth having ‘very little serious support’,67 I take it that, at least in this 
instance, he would prefer a ‘psychological’ reading over any other. 
We can see, then, that even if, like Hick, one considers the possibility of recalling 
previous lives to be essential to the doctrine of reincarnation, there is good reason to hold that 
what Hick terms ‘mythic’ interpretations of the doctrine are fully capable of accommodating 
talk of past-life memories, provided one is willing to allow logical space for multiple 
understandings of what it means to remember previous lives. And, let us recall, there is 
nothing in Hick’s argument that obviates such an allowanceś he seems merely to assume a 
restrictive notion of remembering previous lives rather than arguing for it. There remains a 
question, however, about why we should regard an actual or possible memory link as being 
essential in the first place. The remainder of this section will examine a few illustrative 
                                                          
63 Jennings, The Vedダntic Buddhism of the Buddha, xxiv. 
64 See Nagapriya, Exploring Karma and Rebirth, 97–100. 
65 Ibid., 97. 
66 Ibid., 98–99. 
67 Hick, Between Faith and Doubt, 153. 
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examples of how reincarnation beliefs manifest in believers’ lives, and will consider whether, 
or how, the prospect of remembering one’s own previous lives plays any significant role in 
these cases. 
My first example is from the autobiography of George Harrison (the popular musician 
and ‘ex-Beatle’). In an introductory passage, written by Derek Taylor, Harrison is quoted as 
saying the following about friendship: 
 
Friends are all souls that we’ve known in other lives. We’re drawn to each other. That’s 
how I feel about friends. Even if I have only known them for a day, it doesn’t matter. I’m 
not going to wait till I have known them two years, because anyway we must have met 
somewhere before, you know.68 
 
Although Taylor tells us nothing about the circumstances in which this was said, the 
sentiment that Harrison here conveys is of a piece with what we know of his strong affinity 
with certain Hindu forms of religiosity, especially those propounded by the International 
Society for Krishna Consciousness and the Self-Realization Fellowship.69 Similar sentiments, 
with regard to both friendship and romantic love, have been expressed by many others. 
Michelangelo, for instance, declared to Vittoria Colonna that he saw in her eyes the paradise 
where he loved her before,70 and Goethe wrote to Charlotte von Stein: ‘Oh tell me, what does 
Fate hold in store for us? tell me, how did it fashion between us so pure and strict a bond? 
Oh, in far bygone times you were my sister or my wife’.71 From a perspective more closely 
aligned with Hindu thought, Swami Abhedananda remarks (in a book based on lectures first 
delivered towards the end of the nineteenth century) that ‘Vedanta does not say that the death 
of the body will end the attraction or the attachment of two souls; but as the souls are 
immortal so their relation will continue forever.’72 
Of course, all these statements could be read ‘figuratively’, and there may in each case be 
questions to ask about the depth of belief in reincarnation that it embodies. For our present 
purposes, however, the important thing is that we see in these statements possible ways in 
                                                          
68 Harrison, I, Me, Mine, 18. This statement is also quoted in Mahダrダja, Coming Back, 11–12. 
69 For details of Harrison’s spiritual associations, see Tillery, Working Class Mystic. 
70 See “Rime di Michel Angelo Buonarroti,” VI, in Duppa, The Life and Literary Works of Michel Angelo 
Buonarroti, 231. 
71 Goethe, Selected Verse, 71. I was prompted to look up Goethe’s poem, and the one by Michelangelo, by some 
comments in Cioffi, Wittgenstein on Freud and Frazer, 85. 
72 Abhedananda, Reincarnation, 28. 
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which a belief in reincarnation can be exhibited in a believer’s life – ways that affect the 
believer’s perception of and relationships with friends, lovers and close family members. To 
tell a friend that you must have known one another in a previous life is one way of 
articulating the strength of friendship that you feel for him or her; it is not equivalent to 
saying simply ‘I’m very fond of you’, and (to quote Wittgenstein from a slightly different 
context) ‘it may not be the same as saying anything else.’73 It may, therefore, not be 
paraphrasable in terms that omit any allusion to reincarnation. But do we see in these 
statements any necessity for belief in the prospect of actually or possibly remembering one’s 
previous lives? We might say that the sorts of feelings alluded to by Harrison and others are 
themselves being conceptualized as vague impressions of memory revived by the presence of 
the friend or lover. But the question to be asked here is whether there need be any hope of 
these vague impressions ripening into full-blown vivid memories – a ‘total retrospective 
awareness’ – in order for statements of the sort just considered to count as genuine 
expressions of a belief in reincarnation. 
It is, at least, not obvious why there need be any expectation, or even any thought of the 
possibility, of some future confirmation of the claim that one has known one’s friends (or 
lover or family members) in previous lives – a confirmation secured by remembering the 
lives concerned – in order for statements to the effect that one must have known them in 
previous lives to be both intelligible and of spiritual and ethical poignancy. Of course, such 
statements cannot simply float free of all other ethico-religious commitments in the speak r’s 
life and still retain their sense, but, given a reasonably stable set of reincarnation-related 
beliefs on the speaker’s part, there is no reason to suppose that a latent or occurrent memory 
link must be present in order for the reincarnation belief to make a profound ‘connection with 
actual or possible human experience’.  
A further kind of example of how believers in reincarnation exhibit that belief is those 
which involve reactions to suffering and misfortune. One source of examples of this sort is 
ethnographic research such as that carried out by Ursula Sharma among a Hindu community 
in northern India. On one occasion, Sharma reports, ‘When a boat crowded with pilgrims 
bound for the shrine of a local saint sank in a lake […] and all the passengers were drowned, 
one informant remarked that there must have been some very sinful person aboard for such a 
terrible disaster to have occurred.’74 Although explicit reference to reincarnation is not made 
here, from what Sharma tells us about the surrounding beliefs of the community it is fair to 
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74 Sharma, “Theodicy and the Doctrine of Karma,” 351. 
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read it as suggesting that the sins in question, if not performed in the present life, must have 
been carried over from a former one. It implies that there must be a reason why the boat sank, 
over and above the quite mundane facts that the boat was probably overcrowded and in poor 
condition, even though the speaker of the remark may be in no position to fathom the details. 
Also implicit is an acknowledgement of the radical vulnerability to the vicissitudes of life that 
is so much part of the human condition. For even if there was one person on the boat who, in 
some sense, ‘deserved’ to be drowned, there is no suggestion that this punishment was 
deserved by all. In view of the fact that the passengers were making a pilgrimage to a holy 
site – this being a paradigmatically auspicious form of activity – a thought in the mind of 
Sharma’s informant may be that the sins committed by the person who is karmicly 
responsible for the disaster must surely have been horrendous, otherwise they could not have 
so evidently outweighed the meritoriousness of participating in a pilgrimage. Other believers 
in karma and reincarnation might have responded differently, declaring perhaps that everyone 
who drowned must have deserved their fate, since the law of karma is never capricious, or 
that, in this particular case, a malevolent demon must have contravened the natural karmic 
process and brought about the deaths of innocent people.75 
Again, for our present purposes, the important question is whether the reactions outlined 
above necessarily entail a belief in a forthcoming remembrance, or possible remembrance, of 
previous lives. It does not appear that they do. The reactions are indicative of how beliefs in 
reincarnation are integrated into people’s lives in such a way that, when misfortune strikes – 
whether it be directly in one’s own life or in the lives of others – the believer will be inclined 
to understand that misfortune under the aspect of karma and reincarnation, and hence to see 
in the misfortune a retributive element that is liable either to be completely absent from how a 
non-believer would perceive the events in question or to take a very different form. As with 
the examples of believing that one has known a friend or lover in a previous life, the seeing 
of someone’s death by drowning as a consequence of something terrible done by him or her 
(or by someone else on board the same boat) is liable to be part of a broader framework of 
interconnected beliefs, values and practices; and that framework might include the 
expectation of actual or possible recollection of previous lives. But there is no reason why it 
must. Reactions to misfortune of the sort that have just been considered are intelligible 
without such an expectation on the part of the believer. Though they require a belief that 
                                                          
75 For indications of how the belief in karma is sometimes intermingled with belief in supernatural beings who 
intervene in human affairs, see Daniel, “The Tool Box Approach of the Tamil to the Issues of Moral 
Responsibility and Human Destiny,” and Goldman, “Karma, Guilt, and Buried Memories,” esp. 419–420. 
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there is a connection between the misfortune and some action in a previous life (if not in the 
present one), they do not require the belief that we shall, or may, someday come to learn 
precisely which action is, or which actions are, responsible. 
A supporter of Hick’s proposal that, in the absence of a link of memory, ‘we have nothing 
left which there could be any reason to assert or which could be of any practical interest to 
anyone’76 might contend that without at least a potential memory link it makes no sense to 
regard someone as responsible for what happens to them as a result of actions performed in a 
previous life, since there would be no coherent sense in which it would be them who 
performed those actions. We should be cautious, however, about assuming that a doctrine of 
reincarnation must postulate some connecting factor in addition to the connection that is held 
to obtain between actions and their consequences. To believe that one’s current experiences 
are, in part, conditioned by actions performed in a previous life is, of course, to propose that 
there is a link between that previous life and that which one is now living; but why should the 
link be anything other than the conditioning relation between actions and their consequences 
itself? As many believers in reincarnation see it, ‘The nature of each individual is moulded by 
the experiences of the past’,77 including past actions, irrespective of whether there is or will 
be any remembrance of those experiences and actions. 
 
IV. Conclusions 
The principal conclusion to be drawn from these considerations is that doctrines of 
reincarnation are not well thought of as empirical theories or hypotheses which require the 
possibility of confirmation by means of memory in order to have a meaningful role in 
people’s lives. They are, for the most part, constitutive elements within frameworks of 
thought, evaluation and action. We could call these frameworks ‘metaphysical’, in the sense 
that they are not grounded on empirical data. But they are certainly not metaphysical in 
Hick’s ‘pejorative sense’, where their truth or falsity would make ‘no actual or possible 
experiential difference.’ For one could say that the truth or falsity of reincarnation makes all 
the difference to the life of someone who believes in it; the belief provides the context within 
which one’s relationships with others and one’s judgements about how to act are formed. But, 
in at least the majority of cases, the regarding of one’s belief in reincarnation as true is not 
rightly described as regarding it as well established on the basis of experience, for the belief 
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is itself something that shapes one’s encounters in the world, and which contributes towards 
the formation of particular modes of lived experienc . 
For reasons of the sort just outlined, I find Hick’s search for ‘the criterion or criteria’ of 
reincarnation to be misguided; it assumes that there needs to be some particular criterion, and 
that the criterion in question has to consist in some kind of verificatory experience. These 
assumptions obscure from Hick’s view the meaningful role that beliefs in reincarnation can 
have in people’s lives irrespective of any expectation of coming eventually to remember the 
succession of lives that one has undergone. The great value of Hick’s treatment of the 
doctrine of reincarnation resides in the recognition that he gives to the variety of forms that 
this doctrine can take. As Hick acknowledges, ‘the notion of rebirth [or reincarnation] is a 
family of concepts’,78 and among that family of concepts there are many important 
distinctions to be made concerning their various connections with such things as notions of 
personhood and of religious and ethical responsibility. As I have sought to show, however, 
the investigation of this variety of connections is not well served by attempting to impose a 
sharp dichotomy between ‘factual’ and ‘purely metaphysical’ (or ‘mythic’) conceptions of 
reincarnation. 
There are lessons here for inquiries in the philosophy of religion more generally. 
Although there has not been space to explore the connections thoroughly here, there are 
certain similarities between the ‘factual’–‘mythic’ opposition that Hick sets up in his 
discussion of reincarnation, and the opposition that is often presumed to obtain between 
‘realist’ and ‘non-realist’ conceptions of religious beliefs and language. Certain of the things 
that Hick says about ‘factual’ conceptions of reincarnation resemble, for example, what he 
says elsewhere about ‘naive realist’ conceptions of other religious doctrines, especially with 
regard to the idea of taking certain religious stories or doctrines ‘literally’.79 Similarly, some 
of what he says about treating reincarnation as ‘an illuminating myth’ resonates with what he 
has said about understanding the Christian notion of Jesus as God incarnate in metaphorical 
or mythic terms.80 A key difference, though, is that while Hick affirms a metaphorical 
construal of the Incarnation as the only way of making religious sense of this Christian 
                                                          
78 Hick, Death and Eternal Life, 388. 
79 See, for example, Hick’s characterization of ‘a naive Christian realist’ understanding of chapter 3 of the Book 
of Genesis in Hick, “Religious Realism and Non-Realism,” 6. 
80 See Hick, “Preface,” “Jesus and the World Religions,” and The Metaphor of God Incarnate, esp. ch. 10. 
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doctrine,81 he seems to write off so-called ‘mythic’ conceptions of reincarnation as lacking 
‘any practical interest’.82 
These apparent tensions in Hick’s treatment of beliefs in reincarnation are indicative of 
the problems that are prone to arise when it is assumed that complex and nuanced religious 
and ethical features of people’s lives can be placed into highly generalized categories such as 
‘factual’, ‘mythic’, ‘literal’, ‘metaphorical’, ‘realist’, ‘non-realist’ and so on. While these 
categories may offer useful starting points in certain instances, they are unlikely to take us 
very far. What is required in philosophy of religion, as elsewhere in philosophy, is careful 
attention to particular cases and a suitable degree of wariness about over-simplifying binary 
categorization.83 
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